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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

With the growing availability of Internet access across the globe, social media has
transformed the traditional relationship between government authority and its citizens by
providing the people with an innovative and powerful means to harmonize their efforts in
expressing their political and social concerns. The importance of safeguarding Internet
availability is more critical than ever before as access to the Internet is now the means by
which the world communicates, stays informed, and engages in daily tasks. 1 In the face
of potential social unrest fueled by social media, the United States must take a
preventative approach, one that matches our policy of Internet freedom with technology.
It is paramount that the United States refrains from adopting the oppressive policies of
other governments by shutting down the Internet or restricting access to social media.
This Comment examines the United States’ ability to shut down social media in
response to potential violent social unrest and the effect of such a shutdown. Part II
describes the recent history of social media's effect on social unrest across the globe. Part
III explains social media’s role as a powerful communication tool, capable of fueling
social and political change all over the world. Part IV considers whether the United
States federal government has the legal authority to shut down social media if faced with
a situation similar to the London riots. Part V then analyzes the dangerous impacts of
such government action, while Part VI proposes a preventative approach to address future
attempts in the United States to stop social unrest. Part VII briefly concludes.
II. THE RECENT HISTORY OF SOCIAL MEDIA'S EFFECT ON SOCIAL UPRISINGS ACROSS THE
WORLD AND THE GOVERNMENT’S SUBSEQUENT REACTIONS
A. Arab Spring

¶3

¶4

The “Arab Spring” refers to the recent wave of democratic uprisings that began in
Tunisia and spread across the Arab nations. 2 Using various social media platforms as
their primary mode of communication, the civilian uprisings called for an end to the
oppressive policies and corruption of their existing governments. 3
In Tunisia, protests began following the attempted suicide in Sidi Bouzin by
Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2011. 4 The riots ultimately led to the overthrow of
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali as he fled to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011. 5
1

See Karson K. Thompson, Not Like an Egyptian: Cybersecurity and the Internet Kill Switch Debate,
90 TEX. L. REV. 465, 491 (2011); 157 CONG. REC. S910 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Collins) (“It is essential that the Internet and our access to it be protected to ensure both reliability of the
critical services that rely upon it and the availability of the information that travels over it.”).
2
See Raymond Schillinger, Social Media and the Arab Spring: What Have We Learned?, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 20, 2011, 3:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raymond-schillinger/arab-spring-socialmedia_b_970165.html.
3
See id.
4
Bouazza Ben Bouazza & Elaine Ganley, Jobless Youths in Tunisia Riot Using Facebook, MSNBC
(Jan. 11, 2011, 5:18 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41026780/ns/technology_and_sciencetech_and_gadgets/t/jobless-youths-tunisia-riot-using-facebook/ (Mohamed Bouazizi was a twenty-six-yearold man with a university degree who lit himself on fire when police confiscated the fruits and vegetables
he was selling without a permit.).
5
David D. Kirkpatrick, Tunisia Leader Flees and Prime Minister Claims Power, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/world/africa/15tunis.html?pagewanted=all.
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Tunisian protestors utilized social media, including Facebook and Twitter, as their
primary outlets to communicate and organize their demonstrations. 6 The Tunisian
government responded with increased efforts to control the Internet by blocking
numerous websites covering the protests and recording users’ Facebook passwords to
delete Tunisian activists’ accounts and protest pages. 7
Less than a month following the successful uprising in Tunisia, protests in Cairo,
Egypt began on January 25, 2011 as Egyptians gathered to demand the end of Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak’s regime. 8 On February 11, 2011, after eighteen days of
revolting, “a largely secular, nonviolent, youth-led democracy movement” successfully
removed Mubarak from office. 9 Following Tunisia’s lead, digital revolution continued as
the Egyptian revolution used Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to “organize the
revolutionaries, transmit their message to the world and galvanize international
support.” 10 In response, the Egyptian government blocked Internet access and cell phone
service across Egypt by forcing its Internet service providers to withdraw data access
routes into and out of Egypt. 11
Although countries such as China, Iran, Thailand, and Tunisia have all censored
social media platforms in times of social unrest, the Egyptian government’s complete
shutdown of almost all Internet activity was a “new phenomenon.” 12 The unprecedented
action was particularly surprising because, unlike other authoritarian regimes, Egypt
originally had liberal Internet censorship policies, which was in part how it positioned
itself as a thriving communications sector and a regional hub for Internet investment. 13
Moreover, by unplugging itself from the Internet, Egypt undermines its position as one of
the major conduits connecting the region to the rest of the world. 14

6
Tim Lister, Tunisian Protests Fueled by Social Media Networks, CNN (Jan. 12, 2011, 9:13 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/01/12/tunisia/index.html.
7
Nate Anderson, Tweeting Tyrants out of Tunisia: Global Internet at Its Best, WIRED (Jan. 14, 2011,
7:09 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/01/tunisia/; see Alexis Madrigal, The Inside Story of
How Facebook Responded to Tunisian Hacks, ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2011, 1:20 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/01/the-inside-story-of-how-facebook-responded-totunisian-hacks/70044/.
8
David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html?pagewanted=all.
9
Id.
10
Sam Gustin, Social Media Sparked, Accelerated Egypt’s Revolutionary Fire, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2011,
2:56 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/02/egypts-revolutionary-fire/.
11
See Christopher Williams, How Egypt Shut Down the Internet, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 28, 2011, 11:29
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8288163/How-Egypt-shutdown-the-internet.html; Christopher Rhoads & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Egypt Shuts Down Internet, Cellphone
Services, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703956604576110453371369740.html; Alexandra Dunn,
Unplugging A Nation: State Media Strategy During Egypt's January 25 Uprising, FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF., Summer 2011, at 16 (“[The Egyptian government] first attacked content (information traveling
through media and grounded, non-aggregated social networks), followed by general platforms (Facebook
and Twitter), and then communication infrastructure (mobile telephone and Internet services).”).
12
Williams, supra note 11.
13
See Andrew McLaughlin, Egypt's Big Internet Disconnect, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2011, 4:30 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jan/31/egypt-internet-uncensored-cutoff-disconnect.
14
See Rhoads & Fowler, supra note 11 (“Eight major undersea fiber links now run through the Red Sea
and across the Sinai Peninsula, connecting the region to more developed links in Europe, and from there to
the rest of the world.”).
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B. London Riots
¶7

¶8

What began as a peaceful protest in response to Mark Duggan’s fatal shooting by
Metropolitan police on August 4, 2011 erupted on August 6, 2011 into a full-scale riot
leaving Tottenham, London in flames. 15 The violence and widespread looting quickly
spread beyond Tottenham across several London boroughs and districts. 16 It was widely
reported that rioters used social media, including Facebook and Twitter, to organize and
encourage violence and protest throughout London. 17 BlackBerry Messenger (BBM)
appears to have played a pivotal role by providing users with a more “covert social
network” with untraceable and up-to-the-minute communication. 18
In the aftermath of the riots, the British government explored the idea of turning off
social networks to contain or stop the riots.19 In a statement to the House of Commons,
Prime Minister David Cameron stated that the “[f]ree flow of information can be used for
good. But it can also be used for ill. And when people are using social media for
violence we need to stop them.” 20 He announced that the government was considering
“whether it would be right to stop people communicating via these websites and services
when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and criminality.” 21
C. United States

¶9

The United States has also recently experienced incidents of social unrest enabled
by social media, though not on the scale of the riots in London or the protests in the
Middle East.
1. San Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit

¶10

On August 11, 2011, the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) police shut down its
underground mobile service for three hours to avert an anticipated protest against BART

15

Sara Bolesworth, Barry Neild, Peter Beaumont, Paul Lewis & Sandra Laville, Tottenham in Flames as
Riot Follows Protest, GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/06/tottenhamriots-protesters-police.
16
See England Riots: Maps and Timeline, BBC (Aug. 11, 2011, 11:43 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10321233.
17
See, e.g., Mathew Ingram, Network Effects: Social Media’s Role in the London Riots, GIGAOM (Aug.
8, 2011, 10:01 AM), http://gigaom.com/2011/08/08/network-effects-social-medias-role-in-the-london-riots/
(Twitter and Facebook were used to coordinate specific acts or gatherings.); William Lee Adams, Were
Twitter or BlackBerrys Used to Fan Flames of London's Riots?, TIME (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2087337,00.html (Twitter was used to encourage violence
and spread unrest across Tottenham.).
18
Josh Halliday, London Riots: How BlackBerry Messenger Played a Key Role, GUARDIAN (Aug. 8,
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/aug/08/london-riots-facebook-twitter-blackberry; see Chris
Taylor, London Riots: BlackBerry Messenger Used More Than Facebook or Twitter, MASHABLE (Aug. 8,
2011), http://mashable.com/2011/08/08/london-riots-blackberry-messenger/ (BBM was the most popular
social media medium of choice for rioters to communicate).
19
England Riots: Government Mulls Social Media Controls, BBC (Aug. 11, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-14493497.
20
Prime Minister’s Office, PM Statement on Disorder in England, GOV.UK (Aug. 11, 2011),
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pm-statement-on-disorder-in-england/.
21
Id.
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police for fatally shooting a forty-five-year-old man. 22 In doing so, they denied potential
protesters and train riders access to social media. 23
¶11
The BART police justified the temporarily interrupted cell phone service in a
statement claiming that protestors planned to disrupt BART service by using social media
through their mobile devices to coordinate protests, which would jeopardize the safety of
BART customers on the platform. 24 Indeed, while the British government first took the
time to consider whether they had the ability to shut down certain social media services,
an American transit company took unilateral action by restricting social media access
without such debate. 25
2.
¶12

Flash Robs

The “flash robs” phenomenon—where social media is used to organize groups of
teens and young adults to quickly ransack and loot various retail stores—began to occur
sporadically throughout the United States over the past few years. 26 The spontaneity and
speed of the attacks enabled by social media make it challenging for the police to prevent
or stop the flash mobs in a timely matter. 27
III. WHY SOCIAL MEDIA? SOCIAL MEDIA’S ABILITY TO FUEL SOCIAL UPRISINGS

¶13

Social media’s role as a powerful communication tool has proven to be a vital
instrument in fueling social and political change around the globe. However, critics have
questioned the “outsized enthusiasm for social media” and expressed doubt regarding the
extent to which social media has shaped the current social and political landscape. 28
They argue that social media does not produce the discipline and strategy that social
change has always required. 29 This skepticism is shared by those who question the
supposed “social media revolution” in the Middle East on the grounds that the fascination

22

Eve Batey, BART Defends Decision to Cut Off Cell Service After Civil Rights, FCC Concerns Raised,
SF APPEAL (Aug. 12, 2011, 3:15 PM), http://sfappeal.com/news/2011/08/bart-cell-fcc.php.
23
See id.
24
See Statement on Temporary Wireless Service Interruption in Select BART Stations on Aug. 11, BAY
AREA RAPID TRANSIT (Aug. 12, 2011, 1:08 PM),
http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110812.aspx.
25
See Melissa Bell, BART San Francisco Cut Cell Services to Avert Protest, WASH. POST (Aug. 12,
2011, 5:12 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/bart-san-francisco-cut-cell-servicesto-avert-protest/2011/08/12/gIQAfLCgBJ_blog.html.
26
See Ann Zimmerman & Miguel Bustillo, ‘Flash Robs’ Vex Retailers, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203752604576643422390552158.html (noting the name
“flash robs” describes the criminal incarnation of the “flash mob” phenomenon where individuals used
social media to organize impromptu performances in public spaces).
27
Margaret Rock, Beyond Technology: How Flash Robs Cause Riots, MOBILEDIA (Aug. 10, 2011),
http://www.mobiledia.com/news/102144.html.
28
See Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, NEW YORKER (Oct.
4, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell?currentPage=all;
Ramesh Srinivasan, London, Egypt and the Nature of Social Media, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-innovations/london-egypt-and-the-complex-role-of-socialmedia/2011/08/11/gIQAIoud8I_story.html (arguing that the result of blaming social media for the recent
social unrest is that “we ignore the powerful economic and political grievances that drive discontent”).
29
See Gladwell, supra note 28.
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with social media takes the focus away from understanding the powerful social discontent
that is driving revolution itself. 30
¶14
Admittedly, it is a stretch to suggest that social media was the cause of the recent
social unrest. However, critics will not be able to deny social media’s ability to provide
“real-time networked communication” that has helped fuel the revolutions. 31 According
to Jared Cohen of Google Ideas, social media has been an “accelerant” on incipient
revolutionary movements. 32 “[A]massing support, communicating with like-minded
people, and spreading the word”—the most crucial elements of a protest—remain
unchanged, but social media has expanded the available channels of communication to
quickly convey beliefs that lead to a revolution. 33 In particular, social media has the
unique ability to simplify and drastically reduce the time and costs of organizing a large
group—a notoriously difficult task. 34
Certainly, the Egyptian government’s
unprecedented response of completely shutting down the Internet confirms its recognition
of social media’s capabilities. 35
A. Facebook and Twitter
¶15

Facebook and Twitter as public forums have influenced the way in which the world
views and understands the revolutions. In particular, the public forum created a “global
watchdog” by permitting the world to watch protestors broadcast every moment of the
revolution in real-time. 36 Indeed, though Facebook and Twitter may not have directly
caused the revolutions in the Middle East, “the heat has never been turned up so quickly”
for an authoritarian leader to step down as these social media platforms have “transferred
the voice of international scrutiny from sovereign leaders to a community of millions.” 37
¶16
Moreover, Facebook and Twitter were crucial to Egypt’s revolution because these
new public forums allowed Egyptians to watch the revolution in Tunisia unfold, thereby
providing the validation to identify themselves as part of a larger revolutionary

30

See Caroline McCarthy, There’s No Such Thing as ‘Social Media Revolution,’ CNET (Jan. 26, 2011,
4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-20029519-36.html?tag=mncol;txt.
31
See Mathew Ingram, It’s Not Twitter or Facebook, It’s the Power of the Network, GIGAOM (Jan. 29,
2011, 4:47 PM), http://gigaom.com/2011/01/29/twitter-facebook-egypt-tunisia/ (arguing that due to the
“power of the network,” social media has played an incredibly important role in spreading the word and
organizing protests).
32
Doyle McManus, Did Tweeting Topple Tunisia?, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/23/opinion/la-oe-mcmanus-column-tunisia-twitter-20110123 (noting
that, though social media alone does not make a revolution, access to social media has empowered grassroots movements by making it easier to identify each other and share information, both among themselves
and with the outside world).
33
McCarthy, supra note 30.
34
Noah Feldman, Twitter Can Start a Party but Can’t Keep It Going: Noah Feldman, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 2, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-03/twitter-can-start-a-party-but-can-tkeep-it-going-noah-feldman.html.
35
See David Kravets, Amid Street Protests, Twitter Shuttered in Egypt, WIRED (Jan. 25, 2011, 6:07 PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/01/twitter-revolution/ (The Mubarak administration’s blocking
Internet access “underscored the power of [Twitter] and other social networks as tools to both coordinate
and disperse news of a citizen uprising.”).
36
See Caroline McCarthy, Egypt, Twitter, and the Rise of the Watchdog Crowd, CNET (Feb. 11, 2011,
2:12 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-20031600-36.html.
37
See id.
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movement. 38 Social media’s critical role in the Arab Spring was confirmed by a study
that analyzed more than three million tweets and examined political conversations in the
Tunisian blogosphere. 39 The study found that social media formed “transnational links”
between international and local democratization movements as their stories circulated
around the Arab region. 40 These new tools allowed leaders in neighboring regions to not
only be inspired by the Tunisian revolution unfolding before their eyes, but they also
helped those leaders learn effective strategies for successful organizing. 41
B. Blackberry
¶17

In the aftermath of the London riots, BlackBerry was reported to be the social
media platform that played the most substantive role in spreading the violence and
looting because of its unique capabilities that allow its users to communicate both
privately and instantaneously. 42
¶18
BlackBerrys have recently become popular among the British youth, including
members of urban gangs, in part because of the affordable handsets and free BlackBerry
Messenger (BBM) network and in part because BBM allows them to be part of a much
larger community. 43 Under the BBM service, once users exchange PINs, they are able to
share messages to specific individuals or groups or to all of their contacts, 44 allowing
information to spread not only instantaneously but also to a large amount of people. 45
Thus, BlackBerry provided a particularly effective organizational tool for inciting
violence and looting as rioters used the BBM service to share the times and locations of
riots, safe travel routes, and police activity. 46

38

See Ingram, supra note 17.
See Philip N. Howard et al., Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the
Arab Spring? (Project on Info. Tech. & Political Islam, Working Paper No. 2011.1, 2011), available at
http://pitpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2011_Howard-Duffy-Freelon-Hussain-MariMazaid_pITPI.pdf.
40
Id at 23.
41
See id.
42
See James Ball & Symeon Brown, Why BlackBerry Messenger Was Rioters' Communication Method
of Choice, GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/dec/07/bbm-rioterscommunication-method-choice; Melissa Bell, In London Riots, BlackBerry Messenger Gets Starring Role,
WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2011, 10:27 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/in-londonriots-blackberry-messenger-gets-starring-role/2011/08/09/gIQAwxmW4I_blog.html; Olivia Solon, Why
Has BlackBerry Been Blamed for the London Riots?, WIRED (Aug. 9, 2011, 10:06 AM),
www.wired.com/business/2011/08/blackberry-london-riots/.
43
See Halliday, supra note 18.
44
BlackBerry Messenger, BLACKBERRY, http://us.blackberry.com/apps-software/blackberrymessenger/
(last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (BlackBerry Messenger is an instant messaging application only for BlackBerry
phones. Users can “[s]end and receive messages in seconds, see when [their] contacts are typing, and know
when [their] messages are delivered and read.”).
45
See Ball & Brown, supra note 42 (“Broadcasting on BBM was particularly effective in organising
people on the streets and identifying targets with—as one rioter put it—‘military precision.’ The
‘broadcast’ feature allows users to instantly send the same piece of information to all their contacts,
sometimes running into the hundreds.”); Matthew Holehouse & David Millward, How Technology Fuelled
Britain's First 21st Century Riot, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 8, 2011, 6:24 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8687432/How-technology-fuelled-Britains-first-21stcentury-riot.html.
46
See Ball & Brown, supra note 42.
39
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Furthermore, because the BBM network was originally intended for business
communications where security is crucial, it provides a secure server that encrypts
messages during transmission.47 Thus, compared to Facebook and Twitter, where
communications are public and can be monitored real-time by the police, BBM users are
able to avoid government surveillance during communication. 48
IV. SHUTTING DOWN SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES

¶20

From shutting down the Internet in Egypt to blocking cellphone service in San
Francisco, governments are faced with the repercussions of social media. While
authorities in England are studying social media’s role in fueling riots across the country,
the United States government faces a reality that social media can incite violent mob
behavior throughout the nation. If the United States finds itself in a position similar to
the London riots, the government may arguably have the legal authority to carry out the
British prime minister’s proposition—to shut down social media platforms that are used
to plan criminal activity.
A. Executive Power Under Youngstown and the Communications Act of 1934

¶21

The current state of the law does not directly address the scope of executive
authority over the private sector to force a restriction on social media during a national
security emergency. 49 In such a situation, the Supreme Court's majority opinion and
concurrences in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 50 serve as guidance. 51
¶22
In 1952, faced with an impending nationwide steelworkers’ strike over the failure
to settle a collective bargaining agreement dispute, President Harry S. Truman issued an
Executive Order to ensure the continued operation of the steel mills. 52 Proclaiming “the
existence of a national emergency” in the face of the United States’ involvement in the
Korean War, the Executive Order indicated that steel was “indispensable” to the United
States, as a “work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil [the] national
defense . . . .” 53 President Truman invoked his authority “by the Constitution and laws of
the United States” and as “President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the
armed forces of the United States” to authorize the Secretary of Commerce “to take
possession of all or such of the plants, facilities, and other property” of the steel mill
companies that he deemed “necessary in the interests of national defense.” 54

47

See id.
See id; Peter Bright, How the London Riots Showed Us Two Sides of Social Networking, ARS
TECHNICA (Aug. 10, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/08/the-two-sides-of-socialnetworking-on-display-in-the-london-riots/ (“Unlike protestors campaigning for freedom and openness, for
whom public visibility was important, privacy is a desirable characteristic for those engaged
in criminality.”).
49
See John S. Fredland, Building A Better Cybersecurity Act: Empowering the Executive Branch
Against Cybersecurity Emergencies, 206 MIL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2010).
50
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
51
See Fredland, supra note 49, at 17.
52
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582–83.
53
Id. at 589–91.
54
Id. at 591.
48
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¶23

Justice Black delivered the majority opinion, ruling that President Truman did not
have the authority to issue the Executive Order. 55 Justice Black dismissed the
government’s argument that the President’s Commander in Chief powers supported the
seizure, distinguishing “military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater
of war” from taking “possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from
stopping production.” 56
¶24
In his concurrence, Justice Jackson provided a three-pronged framework for
evaluating the constitutionality of executive decision-making. 57 The framework provides
that the executive power is at its “maximum” when the President acts with express or
implied congressional authorization, 58 at its “lowest ebb” when he acts contrary to
express or implied congressional will, 59 and in a “zone of twilight” when Congress is
silent and the President and Congress have concurrent authority or the distribution of
authority is uncertain. 60 Justice Jackson ultimately concluded that President Truman’s
seizure was in the lowest ebb of executive power, thereby justifying the judicial
invalidation of the Executive Order. 61
¶25
Applying the Youngstown framework, the President may have the legal authority to
use the Communications Act of 1934 62 to temporarily shut down social media. 63 In fact,
the Obama administration has acknowledged in public testimony that section 706 of the
Act, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 606, already provides the Executive Branch sufficient
emergency authority to take “extraordinary measures” when there are “imminent
cyber threats.” 64
¶26
Section 706 of the Act provides the President with broad emergency powers when
he declares that there is a “national emergency”:
Upon proclamation by the President that there exists war or a threat of war, or a
state of public peril or disaster or other national emergency, or in order to
preserve the neutrality of the United States, the President, if he deems it
necessary in the interest of national security or defense, may suspend or amend,
for such time as he may see fit, the rules and regulations applicable to any or all

55

Id. at 589.
Id at 587.
57
Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
58
Id. “A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion
would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.” Id. at 637.
59
Id at 637. In this situation, actions “must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.” Id. at 638.
60
Id. at 637. Here, “[a]ny actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.” Id.
61
Id. at 640.
62
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 606 (1934).
63
See Thompson, supra note 1, at 478–79.
64
Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset: Comprehensive Legislation for the 21st Century: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010), available at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/2010-06-15-reitinger-testimony (statement of Philip Reitinger,
Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection & Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security)
(“Section 706 of the Communications Act and other laws already address Presidential emergency
authorities and Congress and the Administration should work together to identify any needed adjustments
to the Act, as opposed to developing overlapping legislation.”).
56
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stations or devices capable of emitting electromagnetic radiations within the
jurisdiction of the United States . . . . 65

¶27

Accordingly, under the Youngstown framework, section 706 puts the executive
power at its apex because the President is acting “pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress.” 66 Thus, the President only needs to declare that a threat of
“national emergency” exists in order to exercise the legal authority to suspend social
media. 67 Moreover, it is reasonably foreseeable that a President could make such a
declaration if violent rioting and looting was widespread across the United States. 68
¶28
On the other hand, it is arguable whether threatened or actual protests, or even riots
similar to those recently seen in London, rise to the level of a “national emergency”
meriting the suspension of electronic communications platforms. If not, the situation
may be in Justice Jackson’s “zone of twilight” where “any actual test of power is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.” 69
¶29
Although Justice Jackson’s concurrence may suggest that the Executive branch has
authority to exercise some control over private entities in certain circumstances, the
degree to which the President can exercise that power is unclear. Thus, Youngstown itself
ultimately provides inconclusive guidance on Executive power during a national
emergency similar to the London riots.
B. Current Litigation—Kill Switch
¶30

Recent cybersecurity legislative proposals have unsuccessfully attempted to grant
the President a so-called “Internet kill switch”—the power to shut down or limit public
access to the Internet during a national cyber emergency. 70 The term “Internet kill
switch” 71 originally referred to the Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010
(PCNAA), 72 which was introduced on June 24, 2010, by Senators Joseph Lieberman,
Susan Collins, and Thomas Carper. 73 The PCNAA would have granted the President
emergency powers over the Internet, including the power to declare a “national cyber
emergency.” 74
In such a scenario, private owners and operators of “critical
65

47 U.S.C. § 606(c).
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). “A seizure executed by the President
pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude
of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.”
Id. at 637.
67
Thompson, supra note 1, at 478–79.
68
See Id.
69
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
70
See Jon Orlin, In Search of the Internet Kill Switch, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 6, 2011),
http://techcrunch.com/2011/03/06/in-search-of-the-internet-kill-switch/.
71
Even though the bill did not have the words “kill” and “switch,” the PCNAA became known as the
“Internet kill switch” because it gave the President sweeping provisions to control the Internet, including
the ability to shut it down. See id.
72
Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010, S. 3480, 111th Cong. (2010).
73
Id.
74
Id. § 249(a)(1) (“The President may issue a declaration of a national cyber emergency to covered
critical infrastructure if there is an ongoing or imminent action by any individual or entity to exploit a cyber
risk in a manner that disrupts, attempts to disrupt, or poses a significant risk of disruption to the operation
66
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infrastructure” would be forced to “immediately comply with any emergency measure or
action developed” by the Department of Homeland Security. 75
In response to the PCNAA, about two dozen groups, including the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), filed an open letter to Senators Lieberman, Collins, and Carper
opposing the proposal. 76 In particular, the ACLU expressed First Amendment concerns
that the “emergency actions that could be compelled could include shutting down or
limiting Internet communications that might be carried over covered critical
infrastructure systems.” 77
In 2011, shortly after the Egyptian government blocked its citizens from Internet
access, a modified PCNAA was reintroduced to Congress as the Cybersecurity and
Internet Freedom Act of 2011 (CIFA). 78 With the name of the bill now adding the phrase
“Internet Freedom,” CIFA made several additions to alleviate the concerns of civil liberty
groups, including the explicit provision that “neither the President, the Director of the
National Center for Cybersecurity and Communications, or any officer or employee of
the United States Government shall have the authority to shut down the Internet," 79 and
that the government “must not encroach on rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States.” 80 The new bill added substantial limitations absent
from the PCNAA, including limiting the duration of a “national cyber emergency” to
thirty days from the date of a presidential declaration. 81 In addition, under CIFA,
Homeland Security was tasked to "establish and maintain a list of systems or assets that
constitute covered critical infrastructure" based on a number of factors. 82 Only this
“covered critical infrastructure” would be obligated to comply with emergency measures
when the President declares a national cyber emergency. 83
However, the new CIFA still preserved the presidential emergency power
provisions of PCNAA. 84 Following such declaration, Homeland Security is authorized to
direct critical infrastructure owners and operators to “immediately comply with any
emergency measure or action.” 85
CIFA continues to raise concerns among civil liberties groups and critics, as the
proposed legislation would allow the government to restrict access to certain web
content. 86 The Electronic Frontier Foundation expressed concern that “[t]he president
of the information infrastructure essential to the reliable operation of covered critical infrastructure.”).
75
Id. § 249(c)(1).
76
Letter from American Civil Liberties Union et al. to Senators Lieberman, Collins and Carper (June 23,
2010), available at http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/20100624_joint_cybersec_letter.pdf.
77
Id.
78
Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011, S. 413, 112th Cong. (2011).
79
Id. § 2(c).
80
Id. § 2(b)(5).
81
See id. § 249(b).
82
Id. § 254(a)(1).
83
See id. § 249(c).
84
See id. § 249(a)(1) (“The President may issue a declaration of a national cyber emergency to covered
critical infrastructure if there is an ongoing or imminent action by any individual or entity to exploit a cyber
risk in a manner that disrupts, attempts to disrupt, or poses a significant risk of disruption to the operation
of the information infrastructure essential to the reliable operation of covered critical infrastructure.”).
85
Id. § 249(c)(1).
86
See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Internet 'Kill Switch' Bill Gets a Makeover, CNET (Feb. 18, 2011),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20033717-281.html?part=rss&subj=news&tag=2547-1_3-0-20; see
also Meredith Jessup, Committee Passes Plan for Internet ‘Kill Switch’ in Egypt - U.S., BLAZE (Jan. 29,
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would have essentially unchecked power to determine what services can be connected to
the Internet or even what content can pass over the Internet in a cybersecurity
emergency.” 87 The ACLU agreed that the modified proposal “still gives the president
incredible authority to interfere with Internet communications.” 88
¶35
The bill was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs in February of 2011. 89 As of May 2011, committee hearings had been held, but
no major action has occurred since then. 90
¶36
The Cybersecurity Act of 2012 91 was introduced on February 15, 2012, “[t]o
enhance the security and resiliency of the cyber and communications infrastructure of the
United States.” 92 This latest version eliminates language that authorizes the President to
declare a cyber emergency. 93 On July 19, 2012, after considerable negotiation, a revised
version of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 94 was introduced in a good faith effort to
address the concerns of the bill’s opponents.95 The legislation gave Homeland Security
the authority to intercept communications transiting federal networks, create mechanisms
for more information sharing between government and the private sector, and set
voluntary cybersecurity standards for companies that operate critical infrastructure. 96
¶37
Despite President Obama’s op-ed 97 advising Congress to pass the bill, on August 2,
2012, the Senate voted 52-46, falling short of the required 60 votes to invoke cloture. 98
The cybersecurity legislation failed in the Senate for a second time when a procedural
motion to move the Cybersecurity Act forward was rejected 51-47 on
November 14, 2012. 99
2011, 1:52 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/committee-passes-plan-for-internet-kill-switch-inegypt-u-s/.
87
McCullagh, supra note 866.
88
Id.
89
Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011-2012), S. 413, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN00413:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
90
Protecting Cyberspace: Assessing the White House Proposal: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg67638/pdf/CHRG-112shrg67638.pdf.
91
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. (2012).
92
Id.
93
See 158 CONG. REC. S617 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2012) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman) (“One myth
about this bill is that it contains a kill switch that would allow the President of the United States in an
emergency to seize control of the Internet. There is nothing remotely like that in this bill.”).
94
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 3414, 112th Cong. (2012).
95
Lieberman, Collins, Rockefeller, Feinstein, Carper Offer Revised Legislation to Improve Security of
Our Most Critical Private-Sector Cyber Systems, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SEC. &
GOVERNMENTAL AFF. (July 19, 2012), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/liebermancollins-rockefeller-feinstein-carper_offer-revised-legislation-to-improve-security---of-our-most-criticalprivate-sector-cyber-systems-.
96
Siobhan Gorman, Cybersecurity Bill Blocked as Hopes Dim for Compromise, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2,
2012, 7:41 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443866404577565121771512102.html.
97
Barack Obama, Taking the Cyberattack Threat Seriously, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2012, 7:15 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444330904577535492693044650.html.
98
See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 112th Congress – 2nd Session, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=112&session=2&vo
te=00187 (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
99
See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 112th Congress – 2nd Session, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=112&session=2&vo
te=00202 (last visited Apr. 25, 2013); Josh Smith, Cybersecurity Bill Fails to Advance in Senate, Again,
NAT’L J. (Nov. 14, 2012, 6:20 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/cybersecurity-bill-fails-to-
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C. Executive Order
¶38

On July 6, 2012, President Obama signed an Executive Order stating that “[t]he
Federal Government must have the ability to communicate at all times and under all
circumstances to carry out its most critical and time sensitive missions.” 100 The order
lays out guidelines that government agencies must follow to maintain communication
networks during natural disasters and security emergency. 101 However, there has been
concern over Section 5.2 of this order, which authorizes Homeland Security to “‘oversee
the development, testing, implementation, and sustainment’” of emergency measures on
“‘non-military communications networks,’” including private systems. 102 Skeptics fear
that this clause authorizes the government to seize control of all wired and wireless
communications in the United States during a national emergency, thereby giving the
President “‘control over the internet’” beyond the nation’s needs in such extreme
circumstances. 103 White House officials have responded by explaining that the new order
merely updates an executive order signed in 1984 to reflect modern communications
technology. 104 They claimed that the order does not expand the government’s
authority. 105
V. IMPACT OF SHUTTING DOWN SOCIAL MEDIA

¶39

Governments that have faced social unrest enabled by social media have reacted by
restricting social media in hopes of stopping the protests, but their actions have caused
disastrous problems in the short-term and pose long-term consequences.
A. First Amendment Violations

¶40

Although the government may have the legal authority to temporarily shut down
social media platforms under specific and limited circumstances, difficulty arises in
striking the right balance between the government's obligation to preserve public safety
with an individual's First Amendment right to expression. After the recent decision by
BART officials to shut down underground cellphone service and restrict social media
access, 106 BART officials justified their actions as an attempt to protect public safety 107:
advance-in-senate-again-20121114.
100
Exec. Order No. 13,618, 3 C.F.R. 273 (2013).
101
See Dara Kerr, Obama Signs Order Outlining Emergency Internet Control, CNET (July 10, 2012,
9:43 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57469950-93/obama-signs-order-outlining-emergencyinternet-control; Adi Robertson, Obama Clarifies Plan to Keep the Internet Running During Emergencies
in Executive Order, VERGE (July 10, 2012, 5:29 PM),
http://www.theverge.com/2012/7/10/3149831/obama-national-security-emergency-preparednessinternet-order.
102
Kerr, supra note 101.
103
See Robertson, supra note 101.
104
Eamon Javers, Obama's Internet Order: Power Grab or Simple Update?, CNBC (July 11, 2011, 4:15
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/48151460/Obama039s_Internet_Order_Power_Grab_or_Simple_Update.
105
Id.
106
See supra Part II.C.1.
107
See Letter from Bob Franklin, BART Board of Directors President, to BART Customers (Aug. 20,
2011), http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110820.aspx.
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To protect public safety and provide safe and efficient public transportation,
BART has restricted access to the “Paid” and “Platform” areas of its stations to
BART station employees and ticketed passengers who are boarding, exiting or
waiting for BART trains. BART’s temporary interruption of cell phone service
was not intended to and did not affect any First Amendment rights of any person
to protest in a lawful manner in areas at BART stations that are open for
expressive activity. The interruption did prevent the planned coordination of
illegal activity on the BART platforms, and the resulting threat to
public safety. 108

¶41

Despite the fact that, following the action, no protests were held at BART stations
and no injuries resulted, BART’s unprecedented actions 109 drew heavy criticism from
civil rights activists. 110 The ACLU expressed their concern that a government’s ability to
shut down an entire communications network because it does not agree with the content
is an “insult to our constitutional protections for free speech.” 111 The ACLU sent a letter
to BART officials arguing that, based on a First Amendment analysis, BART’s action
restricting all access to mobile communication was an unconstitutional reaction to
passenger safety concerns. 112 The ACLU argued that “speech does not lose its protection
merely because it may lead indirectly to disruption.” 113
¶42
First Amendment scholars agree. Gene Policinski, executive director of the First
Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University, says, although the “[g]overnment can
legitimately stop speech for public safety purposes,” they cannot do so on “mere
speculation.” 114 Rita Kirk, director of the Cary M. Maguire Center for Ethics and Public
Responsibility at Southern Methodist University, said “[t]he BART action to restrict free
speech so that the actions of a few could be curtailed is not warranted.” 115
¶43
Moreover, consumer advocates and digital civil-rights groups have filed an
emergency petition with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), asking them

108

Id.
According to the ACLU, BART is the first known United States government agency to block cell
service for the purposes of disrupting a political protest. Nicole Ozer, No More Cell Phone Censorship on
BART, ACLU (Aug. 15, 2011, 3:15 PM),
http://www.aclunc.org/issues/technology/blog/no_more_cell_phone_censorship_on_bart.shtml.
110
See Terry Collins, BART Cell Phone Shutdown: Safety Issue or Free Speech Violation?, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 15, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/15/bart-cell-phone-shutdownfree-speech_n_927294.html; see also Eva Galperin, BART Pulls a Mubarak in San Francisco, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/bart-pulls-mubarak-sanfrancisco. In light of the recent events in Egypt, critics were quick to draw comparisons between BART’s
“shameful attack on free speech” to that of the former Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, who ordered a
similar shutdown of cell phone service in response to peaceful, democratic protests. Id.
111
Ozer, supra note 109.
112
Letter from Abdi Soltani, Exec. Dir., ACLU of Northern Cal. & Alan Schlosser, Legal Dir., ACLU
of Northern Cal., to Kenton Rainey, Chief of Police, BART (Aug. 15, 2011), available at
https://www.aclunc.org/issues/technology/blog/asset_upload_file335_10381.pdf.
113
Id.
114
Patrik Johnsson, To Defuse “Flash” Protest, BART Cuts Riders’ Cell Service. Is That Legal?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0812/To-defuseflash-protest-BART-cuts-riders-cell-service.-Is-that-legal.
115
Daniel B. Wood, BART Puts Social Media Crackdown in “Uncharted” Legal Territory, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0816/BART-puts-socialmedia-crackdown-in-uncharted-legal-territory/%28page%29/2.
109
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to investigate BART’s actions and declare that local law enforcement lacks the authority
to wholly deny or suspend communication services. 116
¶44
In response to outcry from civil liberties groups, BART’s board members adopted
the Cell Service Interruption Policy117 in December of 2011. 118 The BART board adopted
a policy where BART would have the authority to temporarily interrupt cell phone
service when it “determines that there is strong evidence of imminent unlawful activity
that threatens the safety of District passengers, employees and other members of the
public . . . .” 119 Though the policy is not without problems, 120 a BART spokeswoman
indicated that under the new policy, in a situation similar to that of August 2011, BART
would not have shut down the cell phone service. 121
¶45
With the FCC reviewing whether BART can intentionally interrupt Internet and
cell phone services in anticipation of protests, 122 such actions raise serious constitutional
and policy issues.
B. Economic Consequences
¶46

In addition to raising civil liberty concerns, shutting down the Internet, even
temporarily, may result in severe economic consequences as highlighted by the
experiences in Egypt. In the wake of the Egyptian government shutting down the
Internet, James Cowie of Renesys, a New Hampshire-based firm that tracks Internet
traffic, wrote, “[e]very Egyptian provider, every business, bank, Internet cafe, website,
school, embassy, and government office that relied on the big four Egyptian [Internet
Service Providers] for their Internet connectivity is now cut off from the rest of
the world.” 123
¶47
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported
that Egypt will experience a pronounced economic impact as a result of its actions. 124
The OECD estimated that Egypt had incurred costs of at least $90 million (3–4% of
GDP) from lost revenues as a result of shutting down telecommunications and Internet
services for five days, accounting for approximately $18 million per day). 125 In addition,
they predicted that Egypt will face long-term economic impacts from the loss of business
116
Petition to FCC to Declare BART Actions Unlawful, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH. (Aug. 29,
2011), http://www.cdt.org/report/petition-fcc-declare-bart-actions-unlawful.
117
Cell Service Interruption Policy, BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT,
http://www.bart.gov/docs/final_CSIP.pdf (last visited July 29, 2013).
118
Extraordinary Circumstances Only for Cell Phone Interruptions, BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT (Dec. 1,
2011), http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20111201.aspx.
119
Cell Service Interruption Policy, supra note 117.
120
See Parker Higgins, BART's Cell Phone Shutdown, One Year Later, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
(Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/barts-cell-phone-shutdown-one-year-later (arguing
that BART could abuse the policy’s vague language to limit speech without real justification).
121
Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Asks for Guidance on Whether, and When, to Cut Off Cellphone Service, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/technology/fcc-reviews-need-for-rules-tointerrupt-wireless-service.html?_r=0.
122
Id.
123
Dan Costa, Egypt Flips Internet Kill Switch. Will the U.S.?, PCMAG.COM (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2376905,00.asp.
124
The Economic Impact of Shutting Down Internet and Mobile Phone Services in Egypt, ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (Feb. 4, 2011),
http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3746,en_2649_201185_47056659_1_1_1_1,00.html.
125
Id.
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in other sectors affected by the blocked communication services, including IT services
and the tourism sector. 126
¶48
Compared to Egypt, the United States economy is arguably much more dependent
on, and intertwined with, Internet-based services, which would make restrictions on the
free flow of information even more dangerous. 127 This means that beyond the loss of ecommerce revenue, an Internet shutdown could hamper any business that operates any
part of their supply chain through networking technology. 128
¶49
Some suggest that the United States economy is flexible enough to absorb the costs
of a temporary shutdown of the Internet similar to that in Egypt. 129 However, a larger
risk exists of the government losing credibility with vital private entities. For example,
Google recently closed its Internet search service in China partially because of the
Chinese government’s censorship of Internet content. 130 Google’s retreat is telling
because they have rejected China’s Internet censorship even at the risk of having
“essentially turn[ed] its back on the world’s largest Internet market.” 131 This is not to
suggest that Google would remove its services from the United States in the event of a
temporary Internet shutdown. Rather, this example highlights the fact that as businesses
decide whether or not they will enter or continue in countries where access to the Internet
could potentially be restricted, the United States economy risks losing such private
entities if it decides to exercise control over the Internet.
C. Setting Dangerous Precedent
¶50

Shutting down social media in the United States not only undermines the country’s
efforts to promote democracy, but it also sets a dangerous precedent for authoritarian
governments. Restricting Internet access detracts from the United States government’s
worldwide efforts to establish a network of organizations that could thwart authoritarian
As part of the Obama
foreign governments’ restrictions on the Internet. 132
administration’s drive to protect universal human rights, the State Department has been
working to keep the Internet open by pressuring Arab governments to end their
restrictions on social media. 133 As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out in
her speech on Internet freedom, the United States is committed to ensuring that the
“[I]nternet remains a space where activities of all kinds can take place,” and is “open for
the protestor using social media to organize a march in Egypt.” 134
126

Id.
See Jeremy Hsu, U.S. Internet Shutdown Would “Paralyze the Economy”, TECHNEWSDAILY (Jan.
31, 2011, 2:26 PM), http://www.technewsdaily.com/1973-internet-shutdown-economy-impact110131html.html.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Miguel Helft & David Barboza, Google Shuts China Site in Dispute Over Censorship, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/technology/23google.html.
131
See id.
132
See Josh Rogin, Inside the State Department’s Arab Twitter Diplomacy, FOREIGN POL’Y. (Jan. 28,
2011, 7:16 PM), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/28/inside_the_state_department_s_arab_
twitter_diplomacy.
133
Id.
134
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices & Challenges in a
Networked World, Remarks at George Washington University (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm.
127
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¶51

In fact, following Egypt’s Internet shutdown, the State Department criticized
Mubarak for his interference in digital communication, culminating with Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton’s public statement, “[w]e urge the Egyptian authorities to allow
peaceful protests and to reverse the unprecedented steps it has taken to cut off
communications.” 135 As Queensland University of Technology associate professor Axel
Bruns writes, “[c]racking down on social media at home while promoting it as a tool for
democracy abroad simply doesn’t make sense.” 136
¶52
Moreover, any measures to remove Internet freedoms will validate the Egyptian
government’s action of shutting down the Internet and affirm the Chinese government’s
continued Internet censorship. If the United States decides to shut down social media,
these oppressive governments will quickly point to such behavior to justify their own
repressive policies. 137 Governments around the world are waiting to see how the West
will react to the challenges posed by the Internet so that they can “claim an international
license for dealing with their own protests.” 138 Thus, the domestic challenges posed by
the Internet demand a “measured, cautious response” in the United States because their
actions will likely affect the political behavior of foreign governments. 139
D. Restricting Social Media is Ineffective
¶53

Despite efforts to restrict access to social media in the face of social unrest, such
limitations may prove to be ineffective at fully stifling communications by protestors.
This was the case in Egypt where the government’s strategy of shutting down the Internet
was not enough to stop the Egyptian people from sharing information to organize and
mobilize in opposition.140 In fact, the protests continued in spite of the Internet
shutdown. 141 Activists used circumvention software to access blocked Twitter accounts
and landlines to call friends abroad to tweet on their behalf. 142 When cell phone service
was disrupted, people organized through word of mouth and by physically coming
together, and they communicated with the world through dial-up modems and fax
machines. 143 If anything, by shutting down the Internet, the Egyptian government
increased the protestors’ engagement in the uprisings by indicating just how “thuggish” it

135

Egypt Protests: Hillary Clinton’s Statement in Full, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 28, 2011, 5:51 PM GMT),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8289419/Egypt-protests-HillaryClintons-statement-in-full.html.
136
Axel Bruns, Don’t Shoot the Instant Messenger: David Cameron’s Social Media Shutdown Plan
Won’t Stop UK Riots, CONVERSATION (Aug. 13, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://theconversation.edu.au/dont-shootthe-instant-messenger-david-camerons-social-media-shutdown-plan-wont-stop-uk-riots-2854 (criticizing
Prime Minister Cameron’s proposal to limit social media during times of social unrest).
137
See Jim Killock, Prime Minister’s Attack on Social Media Unwarranted, OPEN RIGHTS GROUP (Aug.
11, 2011), http://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2011/david-cameron (criticizing a statement by Prime
Minister David Cameron and discussing problems with the UK potentially imposing limitations on
the Internet).
138
Evgeny Morozov, Repressing the Internet, Western-Style, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903918104576502214236127064.html.
139
Id.
140
See Dunn, supra note 11, at 19–20.
141
Id at 20.
142
Id at 21
143
Id.

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

[2013

could be. 144 Most importantly, the government-placed limitations on the ability to
communicate openly ultimately proved ineffective as Mubarak was eventually forced
to resign. 145
VI. A PREVENTATIVE RESPONSE
¶54

In light of the wave of social and political unrest that have occurred across the
world, the United States must take a preventative approach. This requires the federal
government to take action before any social uprisings occur so that it is well-equipped to
contain them in the future.
A. Private-Public Partnership

¶55

In the aftermath of the London riots, the British government retreated from its
initial position considering shutting down social media to stop individuals who are
plotting violence on the platforms. 146 Instead, the Home Office had a “constructive”
meeting with representatives of Facebook, Twitter, and BlackBerry where they discussed
“how law enforcement and the networks can build on the existing relationships and
cooperation to crack down on the networks being used for criminal behaviour.” 147 The
UK Home Office took a step in the right direction by acknowledging the importance of a
private-public partnership to respond to national crises where social media is used to
promote criminal behavior.
¶56
As seen in Egypt, activists’ technological knowledge regarding the use of
“circumvention and anonymity technology” will inevitably outpace the government. 148
Therefore, it is imperative to partner law enforcement agencies with social media
companies to explore the different measures that each could take to help prevent or
contain impending disorder.
¶57
The Google-NSA alliance is a good example of a productive private-public
partnership. On February 4, 2010, Google and the National Security Agency (NSA)
partnered to assist Google and its users to better defend against future cyberattacks. 149
This alliance allows the NSA to use its expertise—analyzing “cyber-‘signatures’” in
previous attacks to defend against future intrusions—to help Google evaluate its
hardware and software vulnerabilities. 150 Google, in turn, shares details regarding the
malicious code used to attack its system, without violating Google's policies or laws that
protect the privacy of online communications. 151 The rationale behind this public-private
partnership was rooted in understanding that the critical infrastructure of the United
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States is best protected through a collaborative relationship between the public and
private sectors. 152
¶58
Similarly, prior to any civil unrest, the federal government must reach out to social
media companies to form a collaborative partnership. The government, for its part,
should use its expertise in pushing for freedom in communication by defending United
States-based social media companies like Facebook and Twitter so that they are not
subject to oppressive governments who restrict social media in times of social unrest. On
the other hand, social media companies like Facebook should do their part by being more
active in reporting pages or groups that are inciting disorder, while Twitter should
enhance its efforts to prevent postings of violence-related tweets. 153
¶59
In addition, once civil disorder has broken out, Facebook, Twitter, and other similar
social media companies should be open to working closely with law enforcement to track
riots and obtain real-time data that could help contain the violence, although they should
not be required to go so far as giving the government privileged access to their
networks. 154 At the same time, it is also very important to educate the public to
effectively report civil disorder brewing on social networks. 155
B. Recognizing the Value of Social Media
¶60

Before hastily reacting to social unrest by restricting social media access, it is
important for the United States to first recognize and appreciate the value of social media
during times of crisis. During the London riots, much was made of social media’s power
to incite disruption on such a wide-scale; 156 yet, its ability to bring order was equally
important—at the height of the rioting and looting, law enforcement used social media
such as Twitter to update citizens with accurate information and to dispel rumors. 157 In
addition, even while the riots continued overnight, the very tools that police claimed
rioters used to help organize violence were being used to organize hundreds of volunteers
to clean up the damage. 158 The public also took to social media platforms including
Facebook, Tumblr and Flickr to post photos and videos of suspected looters to help law
enforcement identify the culprits. 159 Thus, for London, the information the police
gathered by keeping social media running during the riots played a substantial role in
eventually containing the riots.
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Recognizing social media’s positive role during times of social unrest is important
because the United States can now shift policy efforts from shutting down social media to
finding more effective ways of using the platforms. 160 Harnessing social media’s
potential will enable law enforcement to respond more quickly and provide the public
with vital information regarding safety and emergency services. 161
C. Enhance Law Enforcement’s Capabilities to Anticipate and Quickly Respond to
Violent Disorder

¶62

It is equally important to ensure that law enforcement officers are equipped with
the necessary technological resources not only to respond to the threats but also to extract
valuable information from social networks. After the London riots, the Metropolitan
police acknowledged that they “‘needed to do more’” to understand how to effectively
use social media, admitting that they were “‘slightly behind’” when it came to Twitter
and Facebook. 162 Richard Allan, Facebook’s director of public policy in Europe, stated
that the London police “‘need to create new mechanisms to catch up with
social media.’” 163
¶63
Recently, the United States took steps in the right direction as the Department of
Homeland Security announced that it is currently developing guidelines on gathering
information for law enforcement purposes from social media sites such as Twitter and
Facebook. 164 Undersecretary Caryn Wagner assured that the protocols are “being
developed under strict laws meant to prevent spying on U.S. citizens and protect privacy,
including rules dictating the length of time the information can be stored and differences
between domestic and international surveillance.” 165 In this newly emerging issue, the
challenge lies not only in developing guidelines for collecting the information but also in
ensuring that the information is analyzed to provide meaningful intelligence. 166
¶64
The New York Police Department (NYPD) has recognized the importance of
enhancing law enforcement’s capability to effectively use social media to respond to
criminal activities. 167 They have formed a new unit specifically to monitor social media
sites like Twitter and Facebook for information regarding planned crimes so as to
anticipate such criminal activity. 168 In addition, the new unit will look for postings,
photos, and videos of crimes that have already been committed to prevent perpetrators
from repeating their criminal activities. 169 The NYPD unit intends to educate its officers
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not only about Facebook and Twitter but also about BBM, the encryption of which makes
it difficult for the police to anticipate criminal activity. 170
¶65
Moreover, there may be opportunities to develop technology that employs social
media to identify and help prevent dangerous incidents from occurring. During Nigeria’s
presidential election last April, Michael Best, a Georgia Tech Associate Professor, and
his team of researchers designed an aggregator tool for a Nigerian group that sought to
use social media to track the election process and identify any potential problems. 171 The
social media aggregator tool received information from different social media sources
and analyzed the data in real time using keywords. 172 Best’s team used social media to
measure public response to political events in real time to help improve the electoral
process. 173 Thus, if violence erupted during or immediately after the Nigerian election,
the time saved by having identified the situation in real time could significantly improve
law enforcement’s ability to respond promptly. 174
¶66
One can imagine a similar aggregator tool that analyzes information from different
social media platforms in real time to improve law enforcement’s ability to respond to
violent riots like those in London or in localized situations like flash robs. It would be
particularly advantageous in an environment where the potential for violence or
unrest is high.
VII.

CONCLUSION

¶67

The advent of social media and its ability to fuel social unrest has empowered
people around the world to successfully challenge their oppressive governments.
However, as the very qualities of social media that promote unprecedented political
progress—“its openness, its leveling effect, its reach and speed”—are used to further
incite criminal civil disorder, it is critical for the government to employ strategies to
quickly respond to such threats without compromising the United States’ commitment to
a policy of an open Internet. 175
¶68
Similar to authoritarian governments that have impulsively responded to civil
unrest with repressive policies of restricting Internet access, the United States may have
the legal authority to take a repressive approach. However, such a response would be at
the expense of civil liberties, severe economic consequences, and setting dangerous
precedents. Moreover, it may ultimately prove ineffective.
¶69
Thus, the United States should employ a preventative strategy. Specifically, prior
to any potential civil disorder, the government should seek to establish relationships with
social media companies to form a collaborative partnership with each party offering
expertise to benefit the other. It is also imperative that the United States analyze and
appreciate the beneficial role that social media played in the recent civil unrest in the
Middle East and London so that legislation can be drafted fully recognizing the
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importance of these communication services. Furthermore, the United States should
increase law enforcement officers’ ability to effectively use social media platforms to
anticipate and promptly respond to violence. By taking action prior to the eruption of
social unrest, the government will be well-equipped to anticipate, prevent, and control
any potential or ongoing violent civil disorders while still preserving Internet freedom.
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